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What happens when a court holds part of a statute, but only
part, unconstitutional? Must the entire statute fall? Can a court
excise, or "sever," an unconstitutional provision so that the
remainder of the statute survives, or does an invalid part render
the whole unenforceable?1
These seemingly straightforward questions have created a great
deal of consternation. Indeed, established doctrine on the sever-
ability of unconstitutional statutory provisions has drawn criticism
on almost every conceivable basis. Commentators have condemned
severability doctrine as too malleable2 and as too rigid;' as encour-
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University;, A.B. 1985, J.D. 1988, Harvard. I thank
Pat Adamski, Bob Brauneis, Robin Charlow, Robert Delahunty, John Duffy, Monroe Freed-
man, John Harrison, Eric Lane, John McGinnis, Greg Maggs, Matthew Movsesian, Richard
Nagareda, John Nagle, Peter Spiro, and Vera Walker for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts, and David Appel and Rob Scott for their research assistance. Support for this work
was provided by a grant from Hofstra University.
1 Courts also use the phrase "severability in discussing the application of statutory
language. In that context, courts ask whether, assuming a statute is unconstitutional as
applied in certain circumstances, there exist other, constitutional, applications of the statute
that can be "severed" and allowed. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003,1018-19 (1995); id. at 1023-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment
in part and dissenting in part); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504-07 (1985);
see also Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51
HARV. L. REV. 76, 82 (1937) (discussing "[t]he problem of separable applications).
To speak of "severing" a statute's applications seems awkward. A court would do better
simply to ask whether it might properly limit the statutes scope. In any event, I limit
myself here to "the problem of severable language": the question whether a provision,
unconstitutional in all its applications, may be severed from the remainder of an otherwise
constitutional statute. John C. Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 208 & n.24 (1993).
For a recent discussion of the problem of "severable" applications, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Eugene D. Cross, Comment, Legislative Veto Provisions and Severability
Analysis: A Reexamination, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 537, 550-51 (1986); Steven W. Pelak, Note,
The Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: An Examination of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 743, 752-53 (1984); Note,
Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L REV. 1182, 1183
(1984) (hereinafter Severability].
'See Glenn C. Smith, From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New Approach
to the Legislative Veto Severability Cases, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 397, 477 (1987).
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aging judicial overreaching4 and as encouraging judicial abdica-
tion.5 They have criticized the doctrine's reliance on legislative
intent6 and its disregard of legislative intent;7 its excessive
attention to political concerns8 and its inattention to political
concerns;9 its lack of any coherent explanation. 0 And while
scholars have paid increasing attention to the question in recent
times, criticism of severability doctrine is hardly new. Max Radin
described its flaws in 1942, and Robert Stern wrote an important
critique almost sixty years ago.1
2
The reasons for this lingering controversy are easy to discern.
One is purely pragmatic. "We live in an age of statutes."1 3
Legislation provides our primary source of law in the late twentieth
century, 4 and legislation of a certain type: lengthy, reticulated
statutes comprising several titles addressing numerous, sometimes
4 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 79-80 (1985); Doff, supra note 1, at
292.
' See Smith, supra note 3, at 466.
6 See Doff, supra note 1, at 291; Nagle, supra note 1, at 206.
7 See Smith, supra note 3, at 476.
8 See WILIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 433 (1993).
' See William A. Shirley, Note, Resolving Challenges to Statutes Containing Unconsti-
tutionalLegislative Veto Provisions, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1808,1821-22 (1985); Kent F. Wisner,
Note, The Aftermath of Chadha: The Impact of the Severability Doctrine on the Management
ofIntragovernmental Relations, 71 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1238 (1985); cf William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,527 (1992) (stating that
current approach to severability is "unrealistic" in light of"positive political theory").
" See A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and
the New Legal Process, 66 TEM L. REV. 1071, 1092 (1988) (book review) (observing that "the
Court has never offered a constitutionally satisfactory explanation of its severability
decisions"); see also Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993)
(noting that "tihe test for severability has been stated often but rarely explained").
" Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 419 (1942).
12 Stern, supra note 1. For an even earlier criticism of severability doctrine, see Note,
Effect of Separability Clauses in Statutes, 40 HARe. L. REV. 626, 626-27 (1927). Of course,
not all early commentary was critical. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law: Partial
Invalidity of Statutes: Power of Legislature to Alter General Rules of Construction, 2 CAL. L.
REV. 319, 319 (1914); Note, Constitutional Law-Partial Unconstitutionality of Stat-
utes-Effect of Saving Clause on General Rules of Construction, 25 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525
(1927).
n ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIvE PROCESS 3 (1995).
"
4 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1991).
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unrelated, subjects.15 Questions of severability inhere in such
legislation. Congress's tendency to enact sweeping, multi-purpose
statutes, along with the continuing expansion of the United States
Code-the Code almost tripled in size between 1964 and 198816-
assure that severability doctrine will retain great practical
significance for the foreseeable future.
Practical significance is not the only reason the controversy
lingers, however. A more profound explanation lies in severability
doctrine itself. Since the mid-nineteenth century, when they began
to address the question seriously, courts have analyzed the
severability of statutory provisions under a contracts approach.
That is, in determining the severability of unconstitutional
statutory provisions, courts have applied essentially the same test
they employ to determine the severability of illegal contract terms.
In contracts law, severability turns on the intent of the parties to
the agreement. A court will sever an illegal term and enforce the
remainder of an otherwise valid contract where the court concludes
the term was not "an essential part of the agreed exchange,"17
that is, where the court concludes the parties would have made the
agreement even without the illegal term."8 The language of the
' See Frank P. Grad, The Ascendancy of Legislation: Legal Problem Solving in Our Time,
9 DALHousiE L.J. 228, 251-52 (1985) (discussing character of twentieth-century legislation).
6 See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpreta-
tion Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1992) (noting that the United States
Code comprised 27,308 pages in 1988, compared to 9797 pages in 1964). Except for enacted
titles, the Code establishes "prima facie the laws of the United States." 1 U.S.C. § 204(a)
(1994). The United States Statutes at Large serves as "legal evidence of laws ... in all the
courts of the United States" and of "the several States." Id. § 112.7 pRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981).
5 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 44-78.
Courts also use the phrase "severability" to describe a related, but different, concept in
contracts law. A court will sometimes describe a contract as "severable where the court can
resolve the contract into separate and independent agreements, some of which are
enforceable and others unenforceable. Take, for example, a contract in which a homeowner
hires an unlicensed plumber to do some work on his home; the homeowner agrees to pay the
plumber $1,000 for labor and $500 for materials. Assume that a local ordinance prohibits
labor by unlicensed plumbers. Rather than hold the entire contract unenforceable, a court
might hold that there are, in effect, two contracts: an illegal $1,000 contract for labor and
a legal $500 contract for materials. The court could then "sever" the illegal contract for labor
and enforce the legal, and independent, contract for materials. RESTATEhMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 183, cmt. b, illus. 1.
It might be less confusing to give this concept another name, perhaps "divisibility," or
"apportionability." Indeed, the Second Restatement of Contracts avoids all such terminology
1995]
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written memorial of the agreement--even a clause providing for the
severance of illegal terms-will not necessarily dispose of the
question. Because severability turns on the intent of the parties,
a court may examine extrinsic evidence, including the contract's
negotiating history, to discover whether the parties in fact believed
the illegal term to be essential. 9
Courts employ this same analysis to determine the severability
of unconstitutional statutory provisions. A statute is viewed for
these purposes as a "bargain" among the legislators who enact it;
2 0
in deciding whether a given statutory provision is severable, a court
will look to that provision's "importance" in that "bargain."21 If
the court concludes that the provision was relatively unimportant
to the legislators, that the legislators would have enacted the
remainder of the statute in its absence, the court will sever the
provision and enforce the remainder of the statute. If, by contrast,
the court concludes that the provision was essential to the legisla-
tors, that the legislators would not have enacted the remainder of
the statute in its absence, the court will refuse to sever the
provision.22 Just as in contracts law, the writing will not neces-
sarily dispose of the question. Because severability turns on the
intent of the legislators, a court may examine the statute's
legislative history for indications of what the legislators would have
wanted.' While it may create a "presumption" in favor of sever-
ability, even an express severability clause cannot overcome
"strong" indications in the legislative history that the legislators in
fact "intended otherwise." 4
To resolve questions about severability by looking to the intent
in the interests of clarity. Id. § 183, cmt. a. In any event, I do not address this version of
"severability" doctrine here. Rather, I address the question whether, assuming that a
contract cannot be divided into separate agreements, an illegal term renders the entire
contract unenforceable. For a further discussion of the difference between the two types of
"severability" in contracts law, see Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 271-72 (N.H.
1991).
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).21 Id.
22 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 108-110.
2' See discussion infra text accompanying notes 113-115.
'AlaskaAirlines, 480 U.S. at 686; see also POPKIN, supra note 8, at 433 (noting apparent
consensus that "a severability clause is not dispositive").
[Vol. 30:41
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of the parties, rather than the written memorial of their agreement,
comports with a proper understanding of contracts. A contract is
a private ordering that binds only the parties who make it. A
contract cannot impose obligations upon third persons, nor can it
confer benefits upon them where they object.' Moreover, in
contemporary understanding, a contract exists independently of any
written memorial the parties may adopt. The writing is not the
contract, but merely evidence of the contract: the contract itself is
an abstraction that derives its existence from the shared intent of
the parties.26 For these reasons, a court can properly look to the
parties' shared intent, rather than the words of the written
memorial of their agreement, to resolve disputes about a contract's
interpretation-including disputes about the severability of illegal
terms.
The contracts approach makes much less sense with respect to
statutes, however. A statute is not, like a contract, a private
ordering that affects only the legislators who enact it. Rather, a
statute is a "political document"27 that binds persons outside the
legislative branch. Those persons have only limited access to the
statute's "negotiations." In order to conform their conduct to the
requirements of law, they must, as a practical matter, rely on the
text of the statute itself. Moreover, unlike a contract, a statute
does not exist apart from its written text. The statute is the
written text: the intent of the legislators has no independent
authority.' Finally, it is much more difficult, as a practical
matter, to determine the intent of the legislators who pass a statute
than it is to determine the intent of the parties to a traditional
bipolar contract.'
For these reasons, the contracts approach is an inappropriate
method for resolving the severability of statutory provisions. In
resolving questions about the severability of statutory provisions,
courts should forgo the contracts approach in favor of a textual
approach. Under such an approach, the text of the statute would
be dispositive. Where the text addressed severability, either
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
7 POPKIN, supra note 8, at 323.
2 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 179-183.
' See discussion infra text accompanying notes 191-198.
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directly or indirectly, a court would enforce the statute's commands;
a court would not, as under the contracts approach, look to
legislative history to overcome the plain meaning of statutory
language in this regard. Where the statute remained silent on the
question, the court would, as a matter of default, sever the
unconstitutional provision and enforce the remainder of the statute.
Part II of this Article describes the severability of illegal contract
terms and demonstrates how the focus on the parties' shared intent
comports with a proper understanding of contracts.30 Part III
discusses the severability of statutory provisions and shows why
the contracts approach makes much less sense with respect to
statutes. 31 Part IV sets forth a textual approach to the severabili-
ty of statutory provisions.32 Finally, this Article concludes in Part
V with some observations about the utility of further comparative
study of contractual and statutory interpretation. 3
II. SEVERABILITY OF ILLEGAL CONTRACT TERMS
It is axiomatic that the law does not, in general, concern itself
with the subject matter of a contract. As long as the parties have
freely assented to the essential terms and have complied with
limited formal requirements, a court will enforce their agreement
without regard to the substance of the exchange.34 Yet freedom
of contract has its limits. Even where there exists an offer, accep-
tance, and consideration, a court will not enforce a contract whose
subject matter is illegal or contrary to public policy.3 A court will
not, for example, enforce a contract to commit a crime 36 or a
30 Infra pp. 46-56.3 1 Infra pp. 57-73.
32 Infra pp. 73-82.
33 Infra pp. 82-83.
' See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern
Contract Theory, 74 IowA L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1988).
"Courts often equate the terms "illegal" and "contrary to public policy" in this context.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 347-48 (2d ed. 1990). There can be a
difference, of course. A contract may be legal, in the sense that the laws do not prohibit its
making, and yet unenforceable on ground of some judicially recognized policy. See id. This
difference bears no relevance to questions of severability, however, and I follow the common
practice in using the terms interchangeably here.
"See, e.g., Homami v. Iranzadi, 260 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (agreement to avoid
compliance with federal and state income tax regulations).
[Vol. 30:41
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tort;37 a contract to exempt oneself from liability for intentional
wrongs;38 a contract to waive one's constitutional rights; or a
contract that imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.4
In such circumstances, the courts have determined that the public
interest outweighs the parties' right to order their affairs as they
see fit.41
Sometimes a contract contains one illegal-and hence, unenforce-
able-provision along with other, perfectly legal, terms. Such a
contract presents a court with three options. First, the court might
simply rewrite the offending provision to make it conform to public
policy. Courts have demonstrated an understandable reluctance to
alter the parties' terms in this fashion, however, and have generally
avoided this approach.' Second, the court might refuse to enforce
the entire contract, legal and illegal terms alike. This option seems
incongruous, however, with the law's overriding policy in favor of
enforcing agreements.' Finally, the court might sever the illegal
provision and enforce the remainder of the otherwise valid contract.
The law has adopted this third approach, with an important
restriction. A court will sever an illegal term and enforce the
remainder of an otherwise valid contract, but only where the illegal
"See, e.g., Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y. 1924) (agreement to defraud
third party).
' See, e.g., Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. Rosen, 361 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(contractual language exempting party from liability for fraud).
"See, e.g., Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.) (contract
precluding party from seeking or holding elective office), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1252 (1991).
' See, eg., Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262 (N.H. 1991) (restrictive covenant
in employment contract).
41 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 5.1, at 345.
The one exception involves the covenant not to compete, or 'restrictive covenant," which
appears frequently in employment contracts. Such a covenant violates public policy where
it has an unreasonably broad scope. See, e.g., Allen, 591 A.2d at 265. In some circumstanc-
es, a court will rewrite a restrictive covenant to render it more narrow and, therefore,
enforceable. For example, a court might alter a covenant that requires an employee to
refrain from competing with his employer for twenty-five years after termination of his
employment to one that requires the employee to refrain from such competition for only two
years. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 5.8, at 385 (discussing recent trend in favor of
reducing scope of unreasonable covenants). This approach remains controversial. See, ePg.,
Vlasin v. Len Johnson & Co., 455 N.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Neb. 1990).
"Pacta sunt servanda. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 5.1, at 348 (!One
of the factors that a court will weigh in favor of enforceability [of a contract] is the public
interest in protecting the justified expectations of the parties.") (footnote omitted).
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term "is not an essential part of the agreed exchange."" Whether
a given provision is an essential part of the agreed exchange turns
on the intent of the parties to the contract.46 A court must
determine whether the parties would have made the agreement
even without the illegal term.48 If the court believes that the
illegal term is not essential, that the parties would have made the
agreement even without it, the court will sever the term and
enforce the remainder of the contract. If, by contrast, the court
believes that the provision is essential, that the parties would not
have entered into the agreement without it, the court will declare
the provision inseverable and refuse to enforce the contract in its
entirety.48
How will a court discover the parties' intent with respect to
severability? It will begin, of course, with the language of any
writing the parties have adopted to reflect their agreement. The
writing may, for example, contain a severability clause providing
4RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 184.
The Second Restatement also provides that the party seeking enforcement of the contract
must not have engaged in "serious misconduct." Id. Whether a party's behavior constitutes
"serious misconduct" depends on the nature of the public policy implicated and the extent
of its violation: the more significant the policy and the more extensive the violation, the
more 'serious" the party's "misconduct." Id. § 183 cmt. b. The "serious misconduct"
requirement goes more to the illegality of the term than the intent of the parties with respect
to severability and, in any event, has not figured prominently in cases addressing the
severability of illegal contract terms. But see Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Ctr., 708 P.2d 1270,
1283 (Alaska 1985) (discussing "serious misconduct" requirement); Allen, 591 A.2d at 272
(same).
' Toledo Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, Local 10 v. City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ohio
Ct. App.), appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1994).
"See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Dev. Corp., 992 F.2d 1398,
1407 n.17 (5th Cir. 1993); Panasonic Co. v. Zinn, 903 F.2d 1039, 1041 (5th Cir. 1990);
Zerbetz, 708 P.2d at 1283 & n.19; Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Coop., 792 P.2d 50, 60
(Okla. 1990); Yakima County (West Valley) Fire Protection Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima,
858 P.2d 245,259 (Wash. 1993); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 22-2(d), at 894 (3d ed. 1987) ("Primarily the criterion would appear to be
whether the parties would have entered into the agreement irrespective of the offending
provisions of the contract." (footnote omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Zinn, 903 F.2d at 1041-42; Allen, 591 A.2d at 272; City of Yakima, 858 P.2d
at 259.
"See, e.g., National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 333-34 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Zerbetz, 708 P.2d at 1282-84 (remanding for determination
whether illegal provisions were essential); Hill v. Names & Addresses, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1085,
1100 (IlI. App. Ct. 1991); Hargrave, 792 P.2d at 60 (remanding for determination whether
parties would have agreed absent allegedly unenforceable provision).
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for the severance of unenforceable terms.49 Alternatively, it may
contain a clause designating certain provisions in the agreement as
"essential."50 Such language will be persuasive, but not necessari-
ly dispositive, on the question of severability. Because severability
turns on the intent of the parties, a court may examine extrinsic
evidence-evidence outside the writing-to determine whether the
parties actually intended an illegal term to be severable. 1 One
type of extrinsic evidence a court may examine is particularly
significant for our purposes: the history of the contract's negotia-
tion. 2 Evidence of the positions the parties took in negotiating
the contract can overcome the language of the written memorial,
even an express severability clause.'
To appreciate how courts determine the severability of illegal
contract terms, consider a couple of representative cases. Consider
first a case from Alaska, Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Center." In
Zerbetz, a state agency hired the plaintiff as its executive director
for a term of three years. The employment contract was extremely
deferential to the plaintiff, providing that he could declare the
agreement terminated and receive the balance of his three-year
salary if the agency attempted to interfere with his management in
certain specified ways-for example, by "reducing [his] authority or
increasing [his] responsibilities. " s The contract also provided that
the agency could declare the agreement terminated by giving the
plaintiff thirty-days notice of its termination." The plaintiff and
'For a sampling of cases addressing contracts containing severability clauses, see Davies
v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1252 (1991); Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905,907 (10th Cir. 1977); Hill, 571 N.E.2d at 1088;
City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d at 803-04. For a case discussing a severability "clause in an oral
contract, see Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. CL App. 1988).
"See, e.g., Abbott-Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 619 N.E.2d 1337, 1343-44 (I1. App. Ct.
1993); Hill, 571 N.E.2d at 1100.
" See, e.g., Zinn, 903 F.2d at 1041-42; City of Yakima, 858 P.2d at 259. But see Save
Elkhart Lake, Inc. v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 512 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(unambiguous severability clause must be enforced as written).
"See, e.g., Eckles, 548 F.2d at 909; Zerbetz, 708 P.2d at 1283; City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d
at 802-04 (unenforceable term severable where contract contained severability clause and
history of term's negotiation did not show that term was quid pro quo for other, enforceable,
terms).
53 See Eckles, 548 F.2d at 909.





the agency apparently did not get along well, and the agency
declared the contract terminated by providing the plaintiff the
required thirty-days notice.5" When the plaintiff brought suit for
the balance due him under the contract, the agency argued that the
contract was unenforceable on grounds of public policy. The trial
court agreed and granted summary judgment for the agency.68
The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed and remanded for further
factual findings.5 9 The court agreed that the provisions allowing
the plaintiff to declare the contract terminated if the agency
interfered with his management constituted an improper and
unenforceable abdication of public authority.' The court believed,
however, that those provisions might be severable from the
remainder of the contract, including the thirty-days notice clause
on which the agency had relied in terminating the plaintiff.,1
Whether the provisions were severable, of course, would depend on
whether they were "'essential part[s] of the agreed exchange,'" 62
that is, whether the parties would have made the agreement even
without them.
The court believed that one could not determine the parties'
intent in this regard on the basis of the language of the written
contract alone. Rather, the court explained, it would be necessary
to examine extrinsic evidence, including the positions the parties
took during the contract's negotiation, to "establish which of [the
agreement's] provisions were essential."' Without further
examination of the parties' "motives and priorities" in making the
contract, the court believed, resolution of the severability question
was impossible.64 The court directed the trial judge to make such
57 Id. at 1273.58 Id.
"Ild. at 1284.
6Id. at 1279.
" The court suggested that the thirty-days notice clause might itself be void as a penalty
and directed the trial court to consider the question on remand. Id. at 1280-82.
"Id. at 1283 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 184 cmt.
a).
"Id. The court also directed the trial judge to examine the negotiating history to
determine whether the plaintiff had engaged in any "serious misconduct." Id. For a
discussion of the "serious misconduct" requirement with respect to the severability of illegal
contract terms, see supra note 44.
6708 P.2d at 1283.
[Vol. 30:41
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an examination on remand.6
The written contract in Zerbetz did not designate any of its
provisions as "essential," nor did it contain a severability clause.
But evidence of a contract's negotiating history can overcome even
such express language. Consider, in this regard, another case
involving an employment contract, Eckles v. Sharman.' The
contract in Eckles, between the owner of a professional basketball
team and the team's coach, contained provisions granting the coach
an option to purchase a five percent ownership interest in the team
and allowing the coach to participate in a pension plan." When
the coach quit to work for another team, the owner brought suit
against him for breach of contract.'
The coach argued that the option and pension provisions were
unenforceable under applicable state law and that the entire
contract was therefore invalid. 9 The owner, by contrast, argued
that the contract was enforceable, at least in part. The owner
pointed to the contract's severability clause, which provided that
"'[i]n the event that any one paragraph of this Agreement is
invalid, this Agreement will not fail by reason thereof but will be
interpreted as if the invalid portion were omitted,' "7o and argued
that the allegedly invalid option and pension provisions were
therefore severable from the remainder of the contract.7' The
district court agreed and granted a directed verdict for the own-
er.
72
The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court agreed
with the coach that the option and pension provisions were
unenforceable under state law. Moreover, the court explained,
there was insufficient evidence to direct a verdict on severability.
Whether the unenforceable provisions were severable, of course,
r Id at 1284.
"548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977).
6 Id. at 907.
"Id.
"The coach argued that these provisions were unenforceable, not because they were
"illegal," but because they were insufficiently definite under applicable state law. See id. at
909. Nothing turns on this distinction for purposes of severability analysis.70 Id. at 907.
71 d. at 909.
72 1& at 908-09.
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depended on whether they were "essential to the contract,"73
which, in turn, depended on the intent of the parties. 4 The
contract's severability clause was " 'but an aid to construction' " in
this regard:7  more relevant evidence appeared in the history of
the parties' conduct during negotiations and afterward. That
evidence was inconclusive; a reasonable person could draw "an
inference one way or the other on the question of [the parties']
intent."7' Although the parties had negotiated for about fifteen
months over the unenforceable provisions, and although the coach
and other witnesses testified that he would not have signed the
contract without them, the record also contained evidence that he
had made no serious efforts to clarify the option clause or do
anything at all about the pension clause.77 The question required
further factual determination; the trial court had erred in granting
a directed verdict for the owner.78
Cases like Zerbetz and Eckles make clear that, in determining the
severability of illegal contract terms, courts look to the intent of the
parties rather than the written memorial of their agreement. This
approach to severability comports well with a proper understanding
of contracts and their interpretation.79 To see why this is so, it is
necessary to understand two fundamental concepts of contemporary
contracts law.
73 Id. at 909.
74 Id.
751 Id. (quoting Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist. v. Denver & S.L. Ry., 45 F.2d 715, 731
(10th Cir. 1930)). The United States Supreme Court has used much the same language to
describe the effect of a severability clause in a statute. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290
(1924) (dictum) (asserting that severability clause is "merely" an "aid" in determining
legislative intent, "not an inexorable command"). For further discussion of the effect of
statutory severability clauses, see infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
76 548 F.2d at 909.
'
tId.
78 Id. at 909-10.
71 Some scholars have drawn a distinction between the "interpretation" and "construction"
of a contract. "Interpretation," on this understanding, "refer[s] to the process by which courts
determine the 'meaning' of the language" the parties have used. E. Allan Farnsworth,
"Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940 (1967). "Construction," by
contrast, refers to the process by which a court determines the legal effect of the language,
which may have little to do with the parties' intentions. See id. at 939; Edwin W. Patterson,
The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUi. L. REV. 833, 835 (1964). This
distinction proves difficult to maintain, and courts have largely ignored it, FARNSWORTH,
supra note 35, § 7.7, at 496-97, as I do here.
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First, a contract is a private ordering." The parties who make
a contract bind only themselves, not third persons. To be sure, a
party to a contract can promise action on the part of a third person,
as where a promisor promises that a third person will perform
services for the promisee." If the third person fails to perform,
however, the promisee's action for breach lies against the promisor,
not the third person; the third person has incurred no independent
contractual obligation.82 Moreover, while a contract may confer a
benefit on a third person-a contract "beneficiary"-it cannot do
so where he objects. A beneficiary can "render any duty to himself
inoperative... by disclaimer.""4
That a contract binds only the parties, and not third persons, has
profound implications for its proper interpretation. In resolving a
dispute about a contract's interpretation, a court need not worry
about expectations the contract's language may create in the minds
of strangers to the transaction. As Farnsworth observes, the proper
"object of contract law is to protect the justifiable expectations of
the contracting parties themselves, not those of third parties, even
reasonable third parties."' Indeed, it is established doctrine that
a court will not interpret the language of a contract in light of
common understanding." Rather, a court will attempt to discover
the meaning the language would have for a person in the position
"See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L REV. 667,
669 (1991).
"I See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 2 ct c.
"See id.; 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.13, at 36-37 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1993).
"3 RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 2(4).
" Id. § 306 ("A beneficiary who has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit
may in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and terms render any duty to himself
inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer.*); see CALAMAPJ & PERI=O, supra note 46, §
17-11, at 715.
" Farnsworth, supra note 79, at 951; see also Arthur L Corbin, The Interpretation of
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORN. L.Q. 161, 164 (1965) (arguing that judge
should realize that object of contract interpretation 'is the ascertainment of the intention of
the parties (their meaning), and not the meaning that the written words convey to himself
or to any third persons, few or many, reasonably intelligent or otherwise).
"R6 TATEmAEN (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 212 cmt a.
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of the parties:87 a person with knowledge of the parties' goals,88
any prior course of dealing between them, 89 any linguistic usages
to which they have customarily held,9° and, significantly, the
positions the parties took during the contract's negotiation.9
The second concept has to do with the independence of a contract
and the writing that serves as its memorial. There is no general
requirement, of course, that a contract be in writing: a contract
may be manifested by oral communication or even non-verbal
conduct.9 2 Even where the parties have adopted a writing to
reflect their agreement, moreover, the contract has an independent
existence. It is a rudimentary principle of contemporary contracts
law that the written memorial is not the contract, but only evidence
of the contract.93 Authorities disagree on which verbal formula-
8 See id. § 202(1) ("Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the
circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great
weight."); id. § 212 cmt. a ("[Tihe operative meaning [of a contract] is found in the
transaction and its context rather than ... in the usages of people other than the parties.").
s Id. § 202(1).
8 FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 7.13, at 528.
90 Id. § 7.13, at 528-30.
9'Id. § 7.12.
92 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 4; see also JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 34 (3d ed. 1990) (explaining that "a contract
does not have to be manifested in language but may be evidenced by conduct"). To be sure,
statutes of frauds provide that a party can, in certain circumstances, avoid the enforcement
of a contract where he has not signed a written "memorandum" of its contents. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 110; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 35,
§ 6.8, at 435 (discussing signature requirement). But statutes of frauds apply only to certain
categories of contracts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 110, and,
in any event, to say that a party can avoid enforcement of a contract in certain circumstances
is not to say that the contract does not exist. See Borchardt v. Kulick, 48 N.W.2d 318, 325
(Minn. 1951) (explaining that oral contracts within statutes of frauds "are not void in the
strict sense that no contract has come into being at all, but are merely unenforceable at the
option of the party against whom enforcement is sought"); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note
35, § 6.10, at 445 (agreement that fails to comply with statute of frauds is still a
"'contract' "). A party who has failed to sign a written memorandum, for example, can
enforce a contract against one who has. See id. § 6.8, at 435; MURRAY, supra, § 74, at 339.
"MURRAY, supra note 92, § 8, at 17; 1 CORBIN, supra note 82, § 1.3, at 12; John E.
Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1342 (1975); see also D.A.F., The
"Unwritten Constitution'and the U.C.C., 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 217,221 (1989) (explaining
that courts do not view" 'understanding of the parties' as being solely embodied in a written
text").
An earlier view, associated primarily with Samuel Williston and the First Restatement of
Contracts, held that, as a general matter, the intent of the parties could have no operative
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tion best captures the essence of a contract-"a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty";'
the "total legal obligation which results from the parties' agree-
ment'; 9 5 "the relations among parties to the process of projecting
exchange into the future,"' to give just a few examples. The
important point for these purposes, though, is that the contract is
an abstraction that derives its existence and its authority from the
shared intent of the parties. That shared intent, not the adoption
of a writing, is the operative fact in the contract's creation.
A contract's independence from the writing that serves as its
memorial also has profound implications for its proper interpreta-
tion. Because the writing is not the contract, but only evidence of
the contract, a court can properly look beyond the writing to resolve
a dispute about a contract's meaning. A court can properly look to
extrinsic evidence-evidence, for example, of the contract's
negotiating history-to discover the parties' shared intent. The
established rules of contract interpretation confirm this under-
standing. While the parol evidence rule generally forbids the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict the terms of a
writing,7 the rule applies only to language that is "clear" or
force apart from the written memorial. See RESTATEmeNT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932); 2
SAMUEL WILLSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 610 (1920). By assenting to the words of a
writing, Williston argued, the parties had rendered their actual intent irrelevant- "if the
parties have made a memorial of their bargain ... their actual intent unless expressed in
some way in the writing is ineffective, except when it can be made the basis for reformation
of the writing." Id. at 1175-76; see also id. § 606, at 1165 (discussing contracts where parties
attach different meaning to language used in the writing). While this view has by no means
disappeared, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261,307 (1985), the prevailing trend is to the contrary. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Expression
Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CA. L REV. 1127,1133-34,
1135 (1994). Indeed, even the most recent edition of Williston's treatise explains that
"although the word contract may, to one in business or a lay person, mean the writing that
evidences a bargain or agreement, it is being used in a different sense in this treatise." 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:1, at 3-4 (Richard A. Lord,
ed., 4th ed. 1990) (footnote omitted).
'4 RESTATEM NT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 1.
95 U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1991).
96 IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (1980).
See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 215; FARNSWORTH, supra
note 35, § 7.2, at 465.
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"unambiguous";98 the rule does not prohibit the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to clarify contractual ambiguities. Indeed, the
current trend, as reflected by the Second Restatement of Contracts,
is to allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent even where the meaning of the writing is "plain."' The
Second Restatement provides that where the contract's negotiating
history shows that the parties shared an intent at odds with the
"plain meaning" of the writing, the parties' shared intent, not the
writing, controls.1"
One can easily see that established severability doctrine comports
with these fundamental concepts of contemporary contracts law.
As a contract binds only the parties who make it, a court need not
worry about expectations the written memorial may create in the
minds of third persons. Moreover, as a contract exists indepen-
dently of the writing, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent can
take priority over the language of the writing-even, in the view of
the Second Restatement, language that bears a plain meaning. As
a consequence, it seems entirely appropriate for a court, in deciding
whether to sever illegal terms, to look to the shared intent of the
parties rather than the written memorial of their agreement-even
where the written memorial contains a clear severability clause.
See, e.g., Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 912 F.2d 366,370 (9th Cir.
1990); McDonald's Corp. v. Lebow Realty Trust, 888 F.2d 912, 913-14 (1st Cir. 1989);
Pelletier v. Jordan Assocs., 523 A.2d 1385, 1386 (Me. 1987); W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri,
566 N.E.2d 639, 642-43 (N.Y. 1990).
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 212 cmt. b. For a
sampling of cases reflecting this trend, see, e.g., White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 120 (7th
Cir. 1982); Alaska Diversified Contractors v. Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist., 778 P.2d 581,
583-84 (Alaska 1989); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140-41
(Ariz. 1993); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 227-30 (Wash. 1990). The extrinsic evidence
must "advanc[e] an interpretation" of which the writing is "reasonably susceptible." A. Kemp
Fisheries, Inc.'v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 852 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 201(1) & cmt. c, illus. 1;
id. § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4; see also Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1133-34 (parties' shared
subjective meaning controls even where unreasonable); Farnsworth, supra note 79, at 959-60
(discussing view that extrinsic evidence is admissible, for purposes of interpretation, even
where contract's language is not ambiguous).
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Il. SEVERABILITY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY
PROVISIONS: THE CONTRACTS APPROACH
Questions about severability occur with respect to federal
statutes'' in much the same form they occur with respect to
contracts. Just as a court must refuse to enforce an illegal
contract, a court must refuse to enforce an "illegal" statute: a
statute contrary to the Constitution of the United States."
Moreover, just as a contract may contain an illegal clause along
with other, perfectly valid, terms, a statute may contain an
unconstitutional provision along with others that pose no constitu-
tional difficulty whatever. Such a statute presents a court with
three options: the same options presented by a contract illegal only
in part.
First, of course, the court might simply rewrite the statute to
make it conform to constitutional requirements. This poses an
obvious difficulty with regard to the separation of powers, however.
Legislative supremacy is a fundamental principle of American
constitutional law: °3 "[a] deeply-embedded premise of the Ameri-
can political system" is that the legislature, within constitutional
limits, "has authority to prescribe rules of law that, until changed
legislatively, bind all other governmental actors within the
system."1 4 For a court to edit the words of a statute, even to
... For the sake of convenience, I limit myself to a discussion of the severability of federal
statutes. The severability of state statutes, of course, is a matter of state law. See Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985). It is worth noting, however, that the states
uniformly have adopted the federal rule. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 290-91, app. at 295.
" Such, after all, is the teaching of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See id. at 180 (affirming "principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that
a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument"); see also William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 36 (describing holding in Marbuy).
"' See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ.
281, 281, 283 (1989); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The
Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988); Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995).
104 Maltz, supra note 103, at 9.
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render the statute constitutional, would contravene this princi-
ple.'0 5 A court has no constitutional authority to rewrite legisla-
tion.
Second, a court might refuse to enforce the entire statute,
constitutional and unconstitutional provisions alike. This option,
too, raises separation-of-powers concerns. Just as a court cannot
rewrite a statute, a court cannot ignore a statute.' °  To refuse to
enforce a statute's constitutional provisions, as well as its unconsti-
tutional provisions, would violate the court's obligation to give
effect to the commands of a statute to the extent the Constitution
allows. As the Supreme Court has explained, "whenever an act of
Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those
found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of [a] court to so declare,
and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid."0 7
As with respect to contracts, therefore, courts have adopted a
third approach. Indeed, courts have adopted the contracts ap-
proach: the severability of an unconstitutional statutory provision
depends on its importance in the "legislative bargain." 08 A
10* See EVA HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAw 227 (1994); Dorf, supra note 1, at 292; cf
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1019 (1995) ("[Als the
Court of Appeals recognized, its remedy required it to tamper with the text of the statute,
a practice we strive to avoid.") (footnote omitted). But cf United States Nat'l Bank of Or.
v. Independent Ins. Agents, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2186 (1993) ("Courts... should 'disregard the
punctuation, or repunctuate, if need be, to render the true meaning of the statute.'")
(quoting Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1881)).
106 HANKS, supra note 105, at 227.
o El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909); see also Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion) ("[A] court should refrain from invalidating more
of the statute than is necessary."); cf id. at 664 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (tracing derivation of severability doctrine to "general rule of construing
statutes to avoid constitutional questions").
108 Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
AlaskaAirlines also teaches that a court must refuse to sever an unconstitutional provision
where the statute cannot function in the provision's absence, that is, where severance of the
unconstitutional provision would render the statute inoperative. See id. at 684; see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (holding provision severable where statute
would remain operative in its absence). Courts have paid "scant attention" to this element
of the Alaska Airlines test, Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir.
1993), and it constitutes merely a "subsidiary" to the inquiry into legislative "intent": "the
fact that valid provisions of a statute are incapable of having legal effect by themselves is
ordinarily conclusive proof that the legislature did not intend them to stand by themselves."
Stern, supra note 1, at 76 n.1; see also Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 ("Congress could not
have intended a constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the
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provision's importance, in turn, depends on the intent of the
"parties" to that "bargain," namely, the legislators who passed the
statute. If the court believes that the provision was not essential
to the legislative bargain, that the legislators would have passed
the statute even in the provision's absence, the court will excise the
unconstitutional provision and enforce the remainder of the
statute."° If, by contrast, the court believes that the provision
was essential to the legislative bargain, that the legislators would
not have passed the statute without it, the court will declare the
provision inseverable and refuse to enforce the statute in its
entirety."
0
How will a court discover the intent of the legislators in this
regard? It will begin, of course, with the text of the statute. Like
a contract, a statute may contain a severability clause declaring
that the invalidity of any provision shall not affect the remainder
of the statute." While such a clause will be an important factor
in a court's determination with regard to severability, it will not
necessarily dispose of the question. As the Supreme Court has
observed, "the ultimate determination of severability will rarely
turn on the presence or absence" of a severability clause.
112
statute if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning independently.*). But cf.
Dorf, supra note 1, at 292 (nThe only real test of severability for all practical purposes is
whether the remaining statute can function as a coherent whole.*).
109 See, eg., New York, 505 U.S. at 186-87; Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 697; INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-35 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) (per
curiam); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 586 (1968); Brown, 992 F.2d at 948; Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 803-04 (Temp. Emer. CL App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852
(1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984).
11 See, e-g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 ([IMhe unconstitutional provision must be
severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have
enacted."); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313-16 (1936); Retirement Bd. v. Alton
1L1., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37
(1895); City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905-06 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1
' For a recent example of a severability clause, see the Congressional Accountability Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 509, 109 Stat. 3, 44 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1438) ("If any
provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is
held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of the provisions of the
remainder to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.).
2 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n.27. As Justice Brandeis explained in dictum in Dorchy v.
Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,290 (1924), a severability clause "provides a rule of construction which
may sometimes aid in determining [legislative] intent. But it is an aid merely; not an
inexorable command." One court has adopted similar language in describing the effects of
a contractual severability clause. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing
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Because the severability of a statutory provision depends on the
intent of the legislators, a court may go beyond the text and
examine extrinsic evidence-the statute's legislative history-to
determine whether the legislators in fact intended the provision to
be severable."' While it may create a "presumption" in favor of
severability,"' a severability clause cannot overcome "strong"
indications in the legislative history that the legislators "intended
otherwise.""
5
The contracts approach to the severability of statutory provisions
has a long lineage. Indeed, it derives from the first case seriously
to address the question, Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided in 1854.116 At
issue in Warren was a Massachusetts statute purporting to annex
the city of Charlestown to the city of Boston, across the Charles
River." 7 By its terms, the statute was to take effect upon the
affirmative vote of Charlestown's "inhabitants" at a town meeting
called for that purpose." 8 The statute required the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen of Charlestown to certify the results of the town
meeting to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who would, in
turn, certify that the law had taken effect."' Although the
meeting approved the statute, members of the Board of Aldermen
refused to certify the results. 2 9 They argued that they had no
duty to fulfill the statute's requirements because the statute was
itself unenforceable: certain of its provisions regarding the election
Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977)).
- See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932 (explaining that presumption of severability raised by
severability clause is supported by legislative history); Dorf, supra note 1, at 289 (discussing
Chadha Court's reliance on legislative history).
114 Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; see also POPKIN, supra note 8, at 433 ("Severability
clauses at most create a presumption favoring severability.").
.Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.
11. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854). Before Warren, the severability of unconstitutional
statutory provisions was assumed, though a few courts suggested in dicta that "the
constitutional parts of the law must be capable of being 'carried out' or Intelligently acted
upon' if they were to stand." Stern, supra note 1, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
117 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 89.
118 Id. at 90. The act also required that the "inhabitants" of Boston approve annexation,
id., but their approval was not at issue in the case.
119 See id.
12 See id. at 85.
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of state and federal representatives were unconstitutional. 2 '
Disgruntled "inhabitants" of Charlestown then brought suit for
a writ of mandamus to require the aldermen to certify the results
of the meeting.' The plaintiffs conceded that the aldermen had
no duty to obey an unconstitutional statutem and that the
provisions in question might pose constitutional difficulties.'
But, they argued, the presence of some unconstitutional provisions
could not render an entire statute unenforceable: the "obnoxious"
provisions would remain inoperative while the constitutional
provisions took effect.' Here, they asserted, the Massachusetts
legislature had authority to enact "the first six lines" of the statute,
which provided for the annexation of Charlestown to Boston; those
six lines could take effect, whatever the fate of other, more
problematic, clauses." As a consequence, the plaintiffs argued,
the presence of some unconstitutional provisions could not excuse
the aldermen's failure to certify the entire act.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw agreed with the
plaintiffs that "the same act of legislation may be unconstitutional
in some of its provisions, and yet constitutional in others,"'m and
that a court could refuse to enforce the unconstitutional provisions,
and enforce the constitutional provisions, as though the legislature
had passed two discrete statutes.' But, he continued, the
provisions, "respectively constitutional and unconstitutional, must
be wholly independent of each other."' 9 To make his point, Chief
Justice Shaw used the language of contracts law:
[I]f [the provisions] are so mutually connected with
and dependent on each other, as conditions, consider-
ations, or compensations for each other, as to war-
rant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
1'Id. at 97.
2 1& at 84.
mId. at 97.
2 Id. at 91-92.
="'Id. at 99.
m Id. at 91, 106.
-'Id. at 98.




whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect,
the legislature would not pass the residue indepen-
dently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them.3 '
Chief Justice Shaw agreed with the aldermen that the provisions
regarding the election of state and federal representatives were
unconstitutional.'' Moreover, he concluded that those provisions
could not be separated from the remainder of the statute under the
test he had announced. The provisions were "connected" with the
act's main object, the annexation of Charlestown to Boston, and
there existed "no ground on which to infer" that the members of the
legislature "would have sanctioned such annexation" in the absence
of those provisions.'32 As a consequence, the aldermen had
correctly refused to enforce the entire statute. 3 3
Chief Justice Shaw's reference in Warren to "conditions, consider-
ations, or compensations" is significant. These, of course, are basic
concepts of contracts law. Indeed, Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in
Warren rests on the assumption-implicit, perhaps, but there all
the same-that the severability of statutory provisions should be
analyzed as though it were a contracts problem. A statute, in Chief
Justice Shaw's view, was a sort of contract: a bargain among the
legislators who enacted it. To decide whether a given provision
were severable, a court had merely to evaluate the provision's
significance to the parties involved. A court could not sever a
provision so central as to amount to "consideration" for the statute's
passage. A court could, however, excise less important statutory
terms.
The contracts approach set forth in Warren quickly became
established doctrine with respect to the severability of statutory
provisions.'34 State courts adopted Warren throughout the mid-
' Id (emphasis added).
... Id. at 106-07.132 Id. at 100.
'33 Id at 107.
13 See Stern, supra note 1, at 80. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES
OF THE AMERICAN UNION 178-79 & n.1 (1868) (setting forth Warren approach).
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nineteenth century.1 35 The United States Supreme Court first
cited Warren in 1876,136 and continued to do so in a number of
decisions around the turn of the century. 37 And, although the
locution has changed some over time-the Supreme Court has cited
Warren only once since 1936," and courts today rarely speak
expressly of "conditions, considerations, or compensations" in
connection with the severability of statutory provisions 139 -the
central element of Chief Justice Shaw's opinion, the contracts
approach, survives.1'
Consider, in this regard, two of the United States Supreme
Court's more recent cases addressing severability, INS v.
Chadha41 and Alaska Airlines v. Brock.1 2  Chadha involved
the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act," which, at the time of Chadha, authorized
either house of Congress to invalidate, by resolution, the Attorney
General's decision to suspend deportation of an alien.144  The
Court held that this one-house "legislative veto" violated the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the
us E.g., State ex rel. Huston v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio St. (1 Critch.) 497,
507 (1856); Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 444,450-51(1861); see also COOLEY, supra note
134, at 179 nn.1-3 (citing cases adopting Warren approach); Nagle, supra note 1, at 213-14
n.54 (same).
"' People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 94 U.S. 415, 418 (1876). The Court discussed
Warren in more detail four years later in Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880).
' E.g., International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 113 (1910); Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45,55 (1908); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,635-36
(1895).
1 8 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,60 n18 (1968); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 316 (1936).
' This is not to say that courts never use such language. For examples, see Eubanks
v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1128-29 (6th Cir. 1991); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 863 P.2d 694, 706 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting); Small v. Sun Oil Co., 222
So. 2d 196, 199-200 (Fla. 1969); Fiorito v. Jones, 236 N.E.2d 698, 704 (Ill. 1968); Fairway
Ford, Inc. v. Timmons, 314 S.E.2d 322, 324 (S.C. 1984).
14 0 Writing in 1937, Robert Stem observed that, although severability doctrine had 'been
restated in various ways by different courts, in substance it has survived without change
since the original Massachusetts decision. Stern, supra note 1, at 80; see also Nagle, supra
note 1, at 213 (stating that Warren approach "has remained virtually unchallenged to this
day").
14462 U.S. 919 (1983).
142 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
1 Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1994)).
14 462 U.S. at 923, 925.
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Constitution and was, therefore, unenforceable.145 The Court
concluded, however, that the legislative-veto provision was
severable from the remainder of the Act.146 Its analysis in this
regard is instructive.
The Court began by noting that the Act contained an express
severability clause declaring that" '[i]f any particular provision of
this Act... is held invalid, the remainder of the Act... shall not
be affected thereby.' ""' The Court conceded that this clause was
"unambiguous" and that section 244(c)(2) qualified as a "provision"
within its meaning.148  Nonetheless, the clause did not, in the
Court's view, dispose of the question. The severability clause
merely raised a presumption of severability: in the Court's view,
it remained necessary to conduct an examination of the Act's
legislative history to determine whether the members of Congress
had actually intended that the legislative veto be severable. 149
While that examination suggested that the members of Congress
had been reluctant to grant the Attorney General final authority
with respect to deportations-a matter emphasized by then-Justice
Rehnquist in dissent 5q--the Court concluded that the legislative
history was "not sufficient to overcome the presumption of sever-
ability" that the severability clause had raised. 1'
Even more than its opinion in Chadha, perhaps, the Court's
unanimous opinion inAlaska Airlines demonstrates the persistence
of the contracts approach. Alaska Airlines involved the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978,'52 section 43 of which established an
"Employee Protection Program" to assist airline workers who had
been displaced by the industry's deregulation. 5 ' Section 43




7 Id at 932 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note) (emphasis omitted).
4 Id.
.4. See id. ("The presumption as to the severability [of section 244(cX2)] is supported by
the legislative history.").
'60 Id. at 1015 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'51 Id. at 932. The Court also noted that section 244, which authorized the Attorney
General to suspend deportations, would continue to operate even absent the unconstitutional
provision. Id. at 934-35.
152 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.) (repealed 1994).53Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 680 (1987).
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authorized the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations necessary for
the program's implementation'54 and contained a legislative-veto
provision declaring that such regulations would take effect sixty
days after the Secretary had submitted them to Congress, unless
during that period either house had adopted a resolution disapprov-
ing them.155
When the Secretary published implementing regulations, fifteen
airlines brought suit to challenge the program's constitutional-
ity.156 The Secretary conceded that the legislative-veto provision
was unconstitutional under Chadha, but argued that it was
severable from the remainder of section 43: a court, the Secretary
argued, should excise the legislative-veto provision and enforce the
rest of the program.'57 The district court held that the legisla-
tive-veto provision was inseverable,' but the court of appeals re-
versed.'59 The court of appeals concluded that there existed "not
a shred of evidence" in the Act's legislative history to suggest that
Congress had considered the legislative-veto provision "to be a vital
feature of the protection plan.""6
The Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the Court, Justice
Harry Blackmun explained that the test for the severability of an
unconstitutional statutory provision was "the traditional one: the
unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute
created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have
enacted."' 6 ' Just as Chief Justice Shaw did in Warren, Justice
Blackmun addressed the question in the language of contracts law.
A court must determine the importance of the unconstitutional
provision, Justice Blackmun explained, in the "legislative bar-
'54Id. at 682.
Alaska Airlines v. Donovan, 594 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D.D.C. 1984), reuld, 766 F.2d 1550
(D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub non. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
157 Id,
id. at 96.
15 Alaska Airlines v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985). affd sub nor. Alaska
Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
'60 Id at 1565.
161 480 U.S. at 685 (footnote omitted); see also &d at 684 (' 'Unless it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, indepen-
dently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative
as a law.'" (citation omitted)).
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gain."'62 Congress might ease a court's inquiry in this regard by
including a severability clause in the statute, but such a clause
would not preclude an investigation of legislative history. Rather,
as the Chadha Court had indicated, a statutory severability clause
would merely raise a presumption of severability that could be
overcome by "strong evidence" that Congress in fact "intended
otherwise."'3
The parties in Alaska Airlines disagreed whether there was an
applicable severability clause: while the Airline Deregulation Act
did not itself contain a severability clause, it had amended an
earlier statute that did." Justice Blackmun believed it unneces-
sary to resolve this dispute, however, for there was ample extrinsic
evidence to demonstrate Congress's intent that the legislative-veto
provision be severable.' 65 The legislative history demonstrated
that the provision was not important to the legislative bargain; the
members of Congress would have enacted the bill even without it.
In contrast to their extensive discussion of the substantive elements
of the program, Justice Blackmun explained, the members had paid
only "scant attention" to legislative oversight.'66
From the mid-nineteenth century to the present, then, courts
have employed a contracts approach to the severability of statutory
provisions. As Part II explains, a focus on the parties' shared
'6 Id. at 685.
163 Id. at 686. "In the absence of a severability clause, however," Justice Blackmun
continued, "Congress' silence is just that-silence--and does not raise a presumption against
severability." Id.
During the early part of this century, the Court employed what one scholar has termed a
"'shifting presumptions' "approach. Nagle, supra note 1, at 219. Under that approach, the
Court would presume that a statute was inseverable if it did not contain a severability
clause; the presence of a severability clause would "reverse this presumption ... and create
the opposite" presumption that the statute was severable. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 312 (1936). The effect these "shifting presumptions" actually had on the outcome
of cases is doubtful, see Stern, supra note 1, at 118-22, and, in any event, Alaska Airlines
makes clear that the Court has abandoned this approach.
164 480 U.S. at 686 & n.8.
65 Id. at 686-87.
'
66 Id. at 693. -In addition, Justice Blackmun explained, the Secretary's role under the
program was "relatively insignificant." Id. at 688. Although the Act authorized the
Secretary to promulgate implementing regulations, their-effect would be incidental to other,
more central, aspects of the program; as a consequence, Justice Blackmun reasoned,




intent, rather than the written memorial of their agreement,
comports with fundamental concepts of contemporary contracts
law.'67 Such an approach fails to comport with a proper under-
standing of statutes, however.
First, unlike a contract, a statute is not a private ordering. A
statute does not bind only the parties who make it; a statute is not
simply a "deal" among the legislators that affects them alone."6
Rather, as Judge Easterbrook has explained, a statute is "designed
to control the conduct of strangers to the transaction."'9 A
statute is a "political document" 70 whose purpose is to provide a
rule of conduct for persons outside the legislative branch, namely,
the members of the executive and judicial branches and the public
at large. Indeed, as the Chadha Court itself suggested, the
capacity to control the conduct of persons outside the legislative
branch is at the core of the concept of legislative power under
Article I of the Constitution. 171
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 79-100.
's In recent years, some scholars have suggested that courts should view statutes, or at
least some statutes, as bargains among legislators and interpret them accordingly. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 541, 547-48 (1983)
[hereinafter Statutes' Domains]; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L, REV. 4, 15-17 (1984)
[hereinafter Easterbrook Foreword]; McNolgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J. 705, 708 (1992); Kenneth A. Shepale,
Congress is a 'They,' Not an "It. Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 IN-'L REV. L, & ECON.
239, 250-54 (1992); cf. D.A.F., supra note 93, at 217 (discussing analogies between contracts
and constitutional interpretation); Gilian K. Hadfield, Incomplete Contracts and Statutes,
12 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 257, 258 (1992) ("[Tlhere are reasons to pursue (the] suggestion
that we adopt [a contracts] model in the analysis of statutory interpretation."). This Article
suggests, of course, that attempts to draw analogies between contractual and statutory
interpretation are misguided. See discussion infra Part V.
1 Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CitI.-KEN-r L. REv.
441, 447 (1990).
'0 POPKN, supra note 8, at 323.
"The Chadha Court explained the "legislative character of the one-house veto provision
at issue in that case as follows:
Examination of the action taken here by one House ... reveals that it
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to
exercise [its constitutional] power... to 'establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose of altering
the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney
General, Executive Branch officials and [a private party], all outside the
Legislative Branch.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
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That a statute is meant to bind people outside the legislative
branch has profound implications for its proper interpretation.
Before those people can conform their conduct to a statute's
requirements, they must know what those requirements are.
172
While members of the executive branch and some larger private
organizations may keep a close watch on Congress, 173 relatively
few persons outside the legislative branch-even those assisted by
counsel-have the resources to follow a statute's "negotiation"
closely. The legislative history provides a record of this "negotia-
tion," of course, but the relevant materials are numerous, compris-
ing "committee reports, conference reports, records of committee
hearings, floor statements, Presidential signing statements, and all
previous legislation or documents of any nature to which any of the
foregoing refer." 174 To research these materials takes enormous
effort. 175 Many are not even available outside major metropolitan
centers.
7 6
As a practical matter, therefore, most people obtain their
knowledge of a statute's requirements from the most obvious and
accessible source, the text of the statute itself. 77  As a conse-
172 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 51 (1989) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Easterbrook,
supra note 169, at 447.
173 Cf DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 19 (1991) (noting that interest groups with "substantial resources... engage
in sophisticated political strategies").
14 Slawson, supra note 16, at 408. The use of presidential signing statements in
statutory interpretation is a fairly recent, and controversial, development. See MIKVA &
LANE, supra note 13, at 784-85.
175 Slawson, supra note 16, at 408.
'Id.; see also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that legislative history is available in "a few offices in the
larger cities"); Monroe H. Freedman, Book Review, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 503,503-04 (1960)
(discussing Justice Jackson's opinion in Schwegmann).
,77 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 172, at 52; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621,667 (1990) [hereinafterNew Textualism] (statutory
text is 'material most accessible to the citizenry"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340 (1990)
[hereinafter Practical Reasoning] (noting "rule-of-law value that citizens ought to be able to
read the statute books and know their rights and duties"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26,57 (1994) [hereinafter Foreword] (noting "traditional rule-of-law view that statutory
text should be the key source of statutory meaning"); Slawson, supra note 16, at 424 (noting
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quence, a focus on intent makes much less sense in statutory
interpretation than it does in the context of contracts law. A
contract binds only the parties who make it, and there seems
nothing inappropriate in holding the parties to their shared intent,
even where the writing they have adopted fails to reflect that
intent. In contrast, a statute binds third persons, and it seems
unrealistic and unfair to require people outside the legislative
branch to abide by private understandings among the legislators of
which they may have little, if any, notice. As Justice Jackson once
observed, to allow "legislative debates to modify statutory provi-
sions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the coun-
try."178
Moreover, unlike a contract, a statute does not exist apart from
the written text. The writing does not "reflect" the statute; the
writing does not "memorialize" the statute; the writing does not
serve as "evidence" of the statute. 179 The writing is the statute,
and the statute is "law":80 the intent of the legislators has no
independent authority. This follows from the detailed mechanism
the Constitution establishes for a statute's adoption.' 8' As Max
Radin observed, the Constitution does not grant legislators the
power "to impose their will... on their fellow citizens, but to 'pass
statutes,' which is a fairly precise operation" whose familiar details
appear in Article :182 A bill becomes "a Law" only after it passes
both the House of Representatives and the Senate and receives the
approval of the President, or, if it does not receive the President's
approval, it passes both the House and Senate on reconsideration
by a two-thirds vote. 18
That legislative intent lacks authority apart from the words of a
statute also has profound implications for statutory interpretation.
Once again, a focus on intent makes much less sense with respect
that "statutes are generally much more accessible than legislative history).17 Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 396-97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
179 Cf In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (Statutes are
law, not evidence of law.").
uId. For an excellent discussion of a theory of "law as statute," see Slawson, supra note
16, at 384, 416, 424.
" See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 172, at 26; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative
History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372-74 (1990).
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L REV. 863, 871 (1930).
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, c. 2.
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to statutes than it does with respect to contracts. And while
scholarly debate about the place of legislative intent continues to
churn,'8" the United States Supreme Court has in recent times
held to a theory of interpretation that places primacy on the
statute's text.'8' To be sure, the Court has not been very consis-
tent in this regard."l 6 The Court may, for example, examine
legislative history to clarify statutory ambiguities, 87 and will not
hold to the text of a statute where doing so would produce an "ab-
surd,"' or perhaps an "odd," result.'89 Nonetheless, as the
Court has explained, "the beginning point must be the language of
1 8 Eskridge and Frickey have identified three main theories of statutory interpretation:
"intentionalism," which emphasizes the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting
the statute; "purposivism," which emphasizes the purpose, or objective, of the statute; and
"textualism," which emphasizes the commands of the statute's text. Practical Reasoning,
supra note 177, at 324. Some scholars, Eskridge and Frickey among them, have advocated
"dynamic" theories that hold that the meaning of a statute can evolve over time. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNA.IC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Practical
Reasoning, supra note 177, at 343, 351-52, 358-60. The popularity of these theories ebbs and
flows, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century
Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732-43 (1993), and a
full discussion of their relative merits is beyond the scope of this Article. As the text
explains-and with the important qualifications there stated-the Court has in recent times
held to a textualist approach.
18 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 846 (1992); Foreword, supra note 177, at 57-58, 59; Frederick Schauer,
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
231, 246. As David Shapiro observes, "[w~hile academics vigorously debate the merits and
applicability of deconstructionism, public choice theory, purposive analysis, and various
theories of 'dynamic' statutory interpretation, justices of the Supreme Court are attempting
with missionary zeal to narrow the focus of consideration to the statutory text and its 'plain
meaning.'" David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921, 921-22 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
1" See Foreword, supra note 177, at 57 ("[T]he Court does not adhere to any single
foundation for statutory meaning."); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1073, 1076 (1992) (empirical study
demonstrating that Court "often" relies on legislative history "to complement textual
sources").
187 See Foreword, supra note 177, app. at 100 & n.40.
" See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1989); id. at 527 (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment); Breyer, supra note 185, at 848-49; Veronica M. Dougherty,
Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory
Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 158 (1994).
"' Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989); ef
Slawson, supra note 16, at 414 (arguing that Public Citizen demonstrates that Court is not
really committed to textualism).
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the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue
judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished." "
Even apart from these conceptual differences, there exist serious
practical difficulties in applying the contracts approach in the
statutory context. Discovering the intent of the legislators who
enact a statute is likely to be a far more difficult enterprise than
discovering the intent of the parties who make a contract. It is one
thing for a court to examine the negotiating history of a traditional,
bipolar contract, involving two parties, thorough negotiations, and
a limited subject-matter.'91 It is quite another for a court to
scour the legislative history of a typical federal statute. Rather
than two parties, a "legislative bargain" involves hundreds, namely,
the members of Congress who vote for the bill"9 and, indeed, one
party that severability doctrine simply ignores: the President. The
vast majority of these "parties" remain silent during the bill's
consideration.'' The congressional leadership may express its
' Estate of Cowart v. Nildos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,475 (1992); see also Metropolitan
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 115 S. Ct. 2144, 2147 (1995) (quoting Cowart).
" Of course, a contract may comprise multiple parties and cover many different subjects.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, §§ 10, 288; id. ch. 13 (introductory
note); 4 ARTHUR L. CoRBIN, CORBiN ON CONTRAcTs § 923 (1951). As a contract grows in
complexity, its interpretation becomes more problematic. The interpretation of a particularly
complex contract, involving numerous parties and various topics, may present the same
practical difficulties as a piece of legislation.
Some scholars, notably Ian Macneil, have argued that the traditional bipolar model fails
to reflect how people make contracts in the real world. These scholars hold that the correct
model is one of a "elational" contract, comprising many subjects and numerous parties with
only vaguely defined aims. See MACNEIL, supra note 96, at 10, 20; Ian 11. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589.595-96 (1974). Indeed, relational-contracts
scholars argue that the parties to a contract often have goals that are non-economic. Ian
R- Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, app. at 902 (1978); see
Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 139, 158; WVilliam C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 545, 550. Whether the "relational7 contract model is the correct one is
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that a relational contract approximates
legislation more than the traditional model described in the text, and would present similar
interpretive difficulties.
' See Farber, supra note 80, at 689 ("[Instead of being split into two camps, the
legislators may be spread out along a spectrum.*); McNollgast, supra note 168, at 710-11.
'
9 See Radin, supra note 182, at 870-71.
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views, of course, but those may bear only a tenuous relation to the
understanding of their colleagues. 9 4 As Slawson has observed,
"[a]bsence of disagreement on the record is... likely to represent
the other members' inattention, lack of interest, or absence."195
Moreover, instead of a limited, well-defined subject matter, a
federal statute may comprise numerous, unrelated topics on which
the legislators have widely divergent views." Indeed, the legis-
lators may care relatively little about the substance of the bill
itself. "[P]olitical science scholarship teaches that," in addition to
their views on the merits of the legislation, "legislators vote for bills
out of many ... motives, including logrolling, loyalty or deference
to party and committee, [and the] desire not to alienate blocks of
voters .... "'v Thus, as the Realists recognized more than sixty
years ago, a search of legislative history to discover the "intent of
the legislators" is of dubious value.'
To summarize Part III: under the contracts approach, the intent
of the legislators, not the words of the statute, controls with regard
to the severability of unconstitutional provisions. But this makes
severability turn on private understandings among legislators of
which persons outside the legislature may have little or no notice.
Moreover, under the contracts approach, the intent of the legisla-
1" See Eskridge, supra note 181, at 383-84; Practical Reasoning, supra note 177, at 327.
Recent public choice scholarship confirms this observation. Public choice may be defined
"'as the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of
economics to political science.'" FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 173, at 7 (citation omitted).
Among other things, public choice scholarship suggests that, by manipulating the order in
which the body votes, the legislative leadership can determine which option, among many,
the body chooses. See id. at 38-42; Shepsle, supra note 168, at 241-50; Statutes'Domains,
supra note 168, at 647-48. Indeed, some versions of public choice theory suggest that a
clever leadership can manipulate the agenda to obtain a result at odds with the intent of the
legislators. FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 173, at 39-40. To be sure, public choice remains
a controversial understanding of the legislative process. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 13,
at 19-24; Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1657
(1993) (book review). Whatever the merits of its broader assertions about the nature of
democratic government, though, public choice theory should make one wary of equating the
expressed views of the legislative leadership with the intent of the legislators.
195 Slawson, supra note 16, at 403-04.
' See discussion supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
"' Practical Reasoning, supra note 177, at 326.
9 MORIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 129-30 (1933); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 399-400 (1941); Radin, supra note
182, at 870-71; Radin, supra note 11, at 410-11.
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tors controls not only where statutory language is ambiguous, or
where statutory language would create an "absurd' result. Under
the contracts approach, the intent of the legislators prevails even
over a clear severability clause. Finally, the contracts approach
requires courts to conduct a search for legislative intent that is far
more difficult, as a practical matter, than a search for the intent of
the parties to a traditional contract. One can see, then, why the
contracts approach to severability is inappropriate in the statutory
context.
IV. SEVERABILITY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY
PROVISIONS: A TEXTUAL APPROACH
What, then, is the correct approach? If present doctrine is flawed
in the ways this Article suggests, what should take its place? If a
court cannot properly employ the contracts approach to determine
the severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions, what
approach should it employ?
The answer follows from the criticisms contained in Part EI. In
resolving questions about the severability of statutory provisions,
courts should employ a textual approach. Under such an approach,
the text of the statute would be dispositive. Where the text of the
statute addressed severability, either directly or indirectly, a court
would enforce the statute's commands; a court would not, as under
the contracts approach, look to legislative history to overcome the
plain meaning of statutory language in this regard. Where the
statute remained silent on the question, the court would, as a
matter of default, sever the unconstitutional provision and enforce
the remainder of the statute.
To understand how a textual approach would work in practice,
and how it would differ from present doctrine, consider first the
most common way that statutes address the question of severabili-
ty. The most common way for statutes to address severability, of
course, is by means of an express severability clause:1 a clause,
'A statute might also contain an "inseverability clause, that is, a clause declaring that
the invalidity of any one provision shaUl invalidate the remainder of the Act. E.g., 25 U.S.C.
§ 1734 (1988) ("In the event that any provision of (a named section] is held invalid, it is the
intent of Congress that the entire subchapter be invalidated.*); id. § 1760 (same); 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-1 note (Supp. V 1993) (declaring that 'if any provision [of two named parts] is held
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like the one contained in the recently enacted Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995, that declares that "[i]f any provision of
this Act ... is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act ...
shall not be affected thereby."" ° Under present doctrine, as we
have seen, "the ultimate determination of severability will rarely
turn on the presence or absence" of such a clause.20 ' While it
may create a presumption of severability, even a clear severability
clause cannot, under the contracts approach, overcome "strong"
indications in the legislative history that the legislators "intended
otherwise."2 2
Under a textual approach, the effect of such a clause would be
quite different. An express severability clause would be dispositive:
a court would give effect to the clear commands of such a clause,
and hold a statute severable, without further inquiry into legisla-
tive intent. To be sure, even under a textual approach, interpretive
questions might remain with respect to the application of a
particular severability clause. Most severability clauses, for
example, apply to statutory "provisions"; 20 3 in any given case, it
might be a nice question whether unconstitutional statutory
language qualified as a "provision" within the meaning of the
relevant severability clause.0 4 But, assuming that it did apply
invalid by reason of a violation of the Constitution, both such parts shall be considered
invalid"); see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (dictum) (discussing Alaska statute).
See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 13, at 75-76 (describing advantages ofinseverability
clauses). Inseverability clauses are comparatively rare in federal statutes and have not
figured in the Court's severability opinions. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 251 n.235.
Nonetheless, there appears no reason why, under a textual approach, an inseverability
clause should receive treatment different from that afforded a severability clause. Under a
textual approach, a court would give effect to an inseverability clause without further inquiry
into legislative intent.
'0o Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 509, 109 Stat. 3, 44 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1438).
"' United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968); see discussion supra text
accompanying notes 111-115.
202 Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987).
203 Supra note 200 and accompanying text.
' The Court addressed this matter, though only briefly, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), discussed supra text accompanying notes 143-151. To recall, Chadha involved the
severability of a legislative-veto provision contained in section 244(c)2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The Act contained a severability clause that applied to" 'any particular
provision'" of the Act. In the course of its opinion, the Chadha Court noted that the
legislative-veto provision in section 244(cX2) was "clearly a 'particular provision' of the Act
as that language [was] used in the severability clause." 462 U.S. at 932. See generally Dorf,
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to the unconstitutional language in question, a severability clause
could not be overcome, under a textual approach, by evidence in the
legislative history that the legislators in fact intended the statute
to be inseverable.
Over the years, a number of commentators have argued against
assigning dispositive weight to statutory severability clauses on the
ground that they are simply "boilerplate":. 5 words that members
of Congress append thoughtlessly to legislation more or less as a
matter of routine. °" "Are we really to imagine," asked Max
Radin in 1942, "that the legislature had, as it says it had, weighed
each paragraph literally and come to the conclusion that it would
have enacted that paragraph if all the rest of the statute were
invalid?" 7 As the members of the legislature fail to pay much,
if any, heed to the presence of a severability clause, the argument
runs, a court should not pay much heed either.
This argument mistakes the object of statutory interpretation.
Again, the comparison with contracts is instructive. A court will
sometimes refuse to give effect to boilerplate language in a contract
on the theory that such language reflects the absence of true
agreement between the parties."0 8 A court may fear, for example,
that the party with superior bargaining power forced the language
on the other;21 or that one party silently inserted the language
supra note 1, at 290 (suggesting that unconstitutional statutory language would qualify as
a "provision" within the meaning of a severability clause).
25See POPKIN, supra note 8, at 433; TRIBE, supra note 4, at 79-80; Radin, supra note 11,
at 419; Stern, supra note 1, at 122-23; Severability, supra note 2, at 118.5-86.
26MIKVA & LANE, supra note 13, at 579; Radin, supra note 11, at 419.
2" Radin, supra note 11, at 419; see also Stern, supra note 1, at 122 ("When legislatures
declared that The invalidity of any part of this statute shall not affect the remainder', they
did not mean it.").
' For a now classic description of this problem, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362-71 (1960); see also CALAUMi & PERILW, supra note
46, § 9-46, at 427 (noting that standardized contracts may not reflect *true assent); G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L REV. 431, 622 (1993)
(noting that parties to standardized contract 'never had a meaningful opportunity to
bargain); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PmT. L. REV. 21, 32-33 (1984) (discussing
Llewellyn's insight about lack of true assent in standardized contracts).
20 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 4.28, at 332-33; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUML L. REV. 629, 632 (1943).
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in an attempt unfairly to surprise the other;210 or that neither
party really paid much attention to the language. While the
extent to which a court can refuse to enforce contractual language
on these grounds remains controversial, 1 2 the emphasis on the
parties' actual agreement, rather than the words of the written
memorial, comports with the fundamental principles of contracts
law discussed in Part 11.213
Refusing to enforce boilerplate language in a statute makes much
less sense, however. A court that attempts to police a bargain
between private parties need not worry about the impact on third
persons.214 A court that attempts to police a "legislative bargain,"
however, must consider the effect on "strangers to the transaction"
as well.21 5 As we have seen, a statute is meant to bind people
outside the legislature, people who must, as a practical matter, rely
on the text of the statute to ascertain their rights and responsibili-
ties." 6 It hardly seems appropriate to hold that those people
must forgo reliance upon plain statutory language because it is
merely boilerplate to which members of the legislature paid little
attention.
The boilerplate argument fails for other reasons as well. It is not
at all clear, for one thing, that members of Congress fail to
appreciate the significance of severability clauses.217 Congres-
sional counsel can advise members of the impact of such clauses.
Indeed, after the Court announced its opinion in Chadha, congres-
sional counsel expressed frustration at the members' rejection of
o See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 246-47 (1995); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1921-22 (1992).
211 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 46, § 9-46, at 427 (noting that party "may
reasonably believe that he is not expected to read a standardized document"); LLEWELLYN,
supra note 208, at 370; Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 242 ("Few hurried travelers, for
example, will pause to read the boilerplate provisions of their car rental agreements."); John
E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1447, 1453-54 (1994).21 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, § 4.26, at 312-13.
211 Supra text accompanying notes 80-100.
214 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 80-91.
215 Easterbrook, supra note 169, at 447.
21S See discussion supra text accompanying notes 168-178.
217 Nagle, supra note 1, at 241.
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their repeated warnings in this regard.21 In addition, while
severability clauses are widespread, they do not appear in every
piece of legislation, or even in every constitutionally questionable
piece of legislation.219 Indeed, controversial legislation sometimes
includes an inseverability clause, a clause declaring that, if any one
provision of the statute is held invalid, the remainder of the statute
shall not have effect.22
Under a textual approach, then, a court would enforce a sever-
ability clause, in accordance with its plain meaning, without
further inquiry into legislative intent: this is its most significant
departure from present doctrine. While an express clause is the
most common way for the text of a statute to address severability,
however, it is not the only way. Even where a statute does not
contain an express severability clause, the text might address the
question indirectly. The statute might, for example, contain
language that declares policies or purposes in the context of which
a given provision appears insignificant. 221 Under a textual ap-
proach, a court would follow such an indirect textual "command"
and sever the unconstitutional provision.
Consider, in this regard, the Court's opinion in New York v.
United States.22 New York addressed the constitutionality of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,22
which directed that each state " 'be responsible for providing, either
by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal of...
low-level radioactive waste generated within the State.' 24 The
Act contained three "incentives" to encourage states to comply with
21 See Legislative Veto and the 'Chadha Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1983) (statement of Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the House Clerk) ('I
always believed, even while these cases were going on, that severability clauses were against
our interest, and consistently advised committees not to insert them.*).
219 See, eg., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) (noting absence of
severability clause in Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985).
' See, eg., supra note 199 (discussing and providing examples of inseverability clauses).
2u See New York, 505 U.S. at 186-87; EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188, 1190-92
(5th Cir. 1984); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 803 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984).
2505 U.S. 144 (1992).
2' Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)).
m 505 U.S. at 151 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(aX1)(A)) (alteration in original).
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their statutory obligations,2" one of which offered states, "as an
alternative to regulating pursuant to Congress' direction, the option
of taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste
generated within their borders."226 The Court held that this "take
title" provision amounted to "coercion" of the states in violation of
the Constitution.227
The Court also held, however, that the take title provision was
severable from the remainder of the Act.' The Act contained no
severability clause.229 It did, however, contain language that
made apparent its objective: that the states "attain local or
regional self-sufficiency in the disposal of low level radioactive
waste.""' Even without the take title provision, the Court
reasoned, the Act would serve this purpose. After all, there
remained two incentives to "coax" the states "along [the] road":231
the Act encouraged states to take responsibility for low-level
radioactive waste by providing certain cash payments and by
restricting states' access to certain disposal sites.232 These two
incentives, the Court noted, would continue to have effect even
without the take title provision; invalidation of that provision,
therefore, would not negate the Act's overall objective.233 As a
result, the Court held, it was possible to sever the take title
provision and "leave the remainder of the Act in force."" 4
Admittedly, the result in New York is somewhat dubious. One
can question the Court's conclusion about the relative insignificance
of the take title provision to the Act's overall objective of encourag-
ing states to take responsibility for the disposal of low-level
Id. at 152.
28 Id. at 174-75. The provision also required states to accept liability for certain damage
claims. Id. at 175.
m Id. at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress'
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution.").
228 Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
m Id. at 187; see id. at 151.
23'Id at 187.
2 Id. at 152-53.




radioactive waste." 5 The precise result in New York is not
important for these purposes, however. The important point has to
do with the Court's method. New York demonstrates that, even
where a statute does not contain an express severability clause, a
court can determine the severability of an unconstitutional
provision by looking to the statute's text.236 Indirect instructions
are always more ambiguous than direct commands, of course, and
the absence of an express clause may well make a court's determi-
nation with respect to severability more difficult-but not impossi-
ble. 2
7
Under a textual approach, then, a court must give effect to a
statute's commands, direct or indirect, with regard to the severabil-
ity of unconstitutional provisions. One final question remains,
however. What result where the text of the statute contains no
such commands? What result where the statute contains neither
an express severability clause nor, as in New York, more oblique
language bearing on the severability of unconstitutional provisions?
For reasons explored in Part M, a search of the legislative history
for indications of legislative intent with regard to severability
would be misguided.m How, then, should a court resolve the
question?
The best approach would seem to be a default rule in favor of
s Cf Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 314 (1936) (refusing to sever unconstitu-
tional labor provisions from price-fixing provisions in act to regulate bituminous coal
industry, reasoning that "the primary contemplation of the act is stabilization of the industry
through the regulation of labor and the regulation of prices; for, since both were adopted, we
must conclude that both were thought essential").
' Significantly, the New York Court did not say whether the Acts legislative history
supported its decision. Cf Dorf, supra note 1, at 291-92 (arguing that New York Courts
failure to cite legislative history suggests departure from traditional intent-based test).
' As we have seen, the New York Court did not rely on legislative history in holding the
take title provision severable. Supra note 236. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme
Court's statutory interpretation cases indicate that an examination of legislative history is
appropriate to clarify ambiguous statutory language or to avoid an "absurd' result. Supra
text accompanying notes 187-189. Even under a textual approach, therefore, a court might
examine legislative history to clarify ambiguous statutory language that relates to
severability or to avoid creating an "absurd" statutory remnant. To employ legislative
history in this manner is to depart from a strict textualist position, of course, but it is a
departure the Court's cases allow, if not require. In any event, relying on legislative history
in this fashion differs greatly from granting legislative history priority over the plain
meaning of a severability clause, as required by the contracts approach.
Is Supra text accompanying notes 168-198.
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severability. 9 Where a statute is silent on the question, a court
should sever unconstitutional provisions and enforce the remainder
of the statute. Such a default rule follows both from separation-of-
powers concerns and an appreciation of present legislative practice.
As explained in Part III, it is a basic principle of constitutional law
that a court must give effect to the commands of a statute to the
extent the Constitution permits.240  For a court to refuse to
enforce a statute's constitutional provisions, as well as its unconsti-
tutional provisions, would run afoul of this principle. As the
Supreme Court has explained, "whenever an act of Congress
contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to
be unconstitutional, it is the duty of [a] court to so declare, and to
maintain the act in so far as it is valid."2 4' A regard for the
proper role of the judiciary suggests that a court should "invalidate
as little of a statute as possible" unless the statute indicates,
directly or indirectly, a contrary result.
242
In addition, a default rule in favor of severability comports with
present legislative practice. As we have seen, an important reason
for the abiding significance of severability doctrine is Congress's
tendency to enact sweeping, multi-purpose statutes that address
2" Adopting a default rule in these circumstances would not be inconsistent with
textualism. Textualism holds that courts must read statutes in light of "maxims" or "canons"
of construction that derive both from generalized notions of legislative intent and from
substantive concerns. See Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
750 (1995); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical
Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743,743-44 (1992); Shapiro, supra note
185, at 925. The default rule that I advocate here may be seen as just such a canon.
To be sure, textualism's reliance on canons is controversial. See MIKVA & LANE, supra
note 13, at 772. Scholars have argued that a reliance on judicially-crafted canons belies any
claim of fidelity to legislative supremacy, see id. at 773-74; Schacter, supra note 103, at 644,
and that, in any event, many established canons are simply incorrect as a descriptive matter.
See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 13, at 773-74. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1224 (arguing that "many traditional
maxims of statutory interpretation embody legitimate and valid inferences of legislative
intent"). A thorough discussion of the place of canons in a textualist theory is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a good introduction to the debate, see Symposium, A Reevaluation
of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992).
lEG See discussion supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
241 El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909); see also Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion).
242 Nagle, supra note 1, at 251.
[Vol. 30:41
SEVERABILITY
numerous, sometimes unrelated, subjects.2 " To allow an isolated
constitutional error to wreck such omnibus legislation would create
unnecessary confusion and inconvenience.2 " At the very least,
Congress would need to reenact the valid portions of the stat-
ute;' " in the case of some omnibus legislation, like appropriations
or authorization bills, Congress might need to act on an emergency
basis. The executive branch would need to review any regulations
that it had promulgated under the invalidated statutory scheme.
To be sure, such costs are imposed any time a court declares a
statute unconstitutional. Their existence, however, suggests that
the invalidity of one provision should not be taken, at least without
further statutory indication, to invalidate an entire statutory
scheme.'
One might argue, of course, that the default rule should be
precisely the opposite: that where a statute is silent on the
question, a court should declare unconstitutional provisions
inseverable and refuse to enforce the remainder of the statute. A
default rule against severability, the argument runs, would avoid
the potential for "judicial legislation" that exists where a court
enforces, without any statutory authorization, onlypart of a statute
that Congress has enacted.247 Moreover, such a rule would help
ensure that a court did not inadvertently upset any "compromise"
that the legislators had reached in passing the legislation:248 a
default rule against severability would prevent a court from ripping
Supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
24 Cf Shapiro, supra note 185, at 925 (arguing that close questions of statutory
construction should be "resolved in favor of continuity and against change").
2' See Nagle, supra note 1, at 227.
' One might argue that a court should not sever an unconstitutional provision where
doing so would leave a statute incapable of operation. In those circumstances, the argument
runs, a court should declare the unconstitutional provision inseverable and refuse to enforce
the statute as a whole. See supra note 108. This argument is specious. By definition, an
inoperative statute cannot be enforced. There is no practical difference between holding a
provision severable and creating an inoperative statute, and holding a provision inseverable
and refusing to enforce the statute as a whole.
" See TRINE, supra note 4, at 79-80; Dorf, supra note 1, at 292-93.
Cf Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast,
48 U. PiT'. L. REV. 639, 657 (1987) ("Since the building of majorities necessarily requires
compromise, a broad reading of a controversial statute is far more likely to undermine
legislative intent than support it.").
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"the quid from the quo."2 49 Finally, as Dorf has recently suggest-
ed, a default rule against severability might encourage members of
the legislature to take more seriously their obligation to enact
legislation in conformity with constitutional requirements. 25 0  If
members of Congress knew that a single constitutional error would
invalidate an entire statute, Doff suggests, they might well pay
closer attention to constitutional issues that the legislation
presents. 251
Though plausible, these arguments ultimately fail to persuade.
It is true that a default rule in favor of severability might create
the potential for judicial overreaching. But this is a difficulty that
Congress can easily avoid. If Congress wishes to preclude a court's
discretion to sever unconstitutional statutory provisions, it need
merely include an inseverability clause of the sort described
earlier.252 Moreover, for the reasons explained in Part III, there
is little sense in honoring private legislative "compromises" that fail
to appear in the language of a statute.253 Finally, the impact of
the sort of judicial encouragement that Dorf describes is doubtful.
"In the end," as Dorf himself concedes, "judicially crafted rules can
only go so far towards ensuring that Congress fulfills its constitu-
tional role."'
V. CONCLUSION
The contracts approach to the severability of statutory provisions,
which has been part of established law since the mid-nineteenth
century, fails to comport with a proper understanding of statutes.
The same rule for severability cannot obtain with respect to both
contracts and statutes. The severability of statutory provisions
should be governed by a textual approach.
A more profound observation follows from this conclusion. As
249 Nagle, supra note 1, at 226.
2"0 Dorf, supra note 1, at 293.2
M
1 Id.
22 Supra note 199. In their recent book, Judge Abner Mikva and Professor Eric Lane
suggest that Congress should include inseverability clauses in controversial legislation for
just this reason. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 13, at 579.
' See discussion supra text accompanying notes 168-198.
25 Dorf, supra note 1, at 293.
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Farber has remarked, there is very little scholarship comparing, in
any systematic way, the interpretation of contracts and stat-
utes. 5  What comparative scholarship there is, moreover-most-
ly work in law-and-economics and public-choice theory-largely
assumes that difficulties in statutory interpretation can be solved
by applying the interpretive methodology of contracts law.'
This scholarship suggests that if courts would interpret stat-
utes-at least some statutes257-- the way they interpret contracts,
the enterprise of statutory interpretation would make much more
sense.
This Article demonstrates, however, that applying the methodolo-
gy of contracts law to the interpretation of statutes may create
difficulties, not solve them. That, after all, was Chief Justice
Shaw's mistake in Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown,ws and it has
plagued severability doctrine ever since. As we have seen,
contracts and statutes differ in fundamental ways, and one should
be wary of their casual equation. 9 Further comparative study
would illuminate both.
' Farber, supra note 80, at 667. Farber believes that the lack of comparative work
stems from scholarly specialization. "ew constitutional law or legislation scholars teach
courses like property or contracts; of those few, most probably regard these courses as
pedagogical chores rather than potential sources of inspiration." Id. at 668.
"* See sources cited supra note 168. But see Easterbrook, supra note 169, at 445-46
(discussing difference between interpreting contracts and statutes). For a recent comparison
of interpretation in the context of statutes and collective bargaining agreements, see James
E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. REv. 283 (1995).
' See Easterbrook Foreword, supra note 168, at 15-17; Statutes' Domains, supra note
168, at 541.
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 116-133).
2 9 See Easterbrook, supra note 169, at 445-46; Hadfield, supra note 168, at 257; William
D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL L Rsv. 541, 544,
570-71 (1988).
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